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1. Individual Memory in Extensive Games 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern formulated extensive games in their book: 
"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" (1944). A few years later， Kuhn (1953) gave 
a simpler description of an extensive game， which we will follow here. The description 
has proved very beneficial for analysing strategic situations with several players. It is 
general enough to incorporate differences in: the information available to the various 
players， the timing and sequence of moves， strategic possibilities， objectives of the 
players， and even memory. 
Since our focus is on individual memory here， we use examples involving only one 
player. Let's see how the memory of a player can be described by an extensi ve game. 
Individual forgetfulness can be broken into a forgetting what one did， and forgetting what 
one learned. 
To show the first type of forgetfulness， consider a professor who drives to work each 
morning and parks his car in Lot A or Lot B. The professor is typical1y pre-occupied with 
deep thoughts， and by the end of the day he has forgotten where he parked that morning. 
Lot A is located to the East of the professor's office， and Lot B is located to the West. 







The bottom bubble in Figure 1 labelled "Morning" describes the situation the professor 
faces in the morning when he chooses either "Lot A" or "Lot B". The top bubble labelled 
"Evening" describes the situation he faces in the evening when he must choose to walk to 
"Lot A" or "Lot B". In order to capture his inabi1ity to recaI1 what he did in the 
"Morning"， we have put the two possibi1ities "x" and "y" in the same bubble. Possibi1ity 
"x" occurs after "Lot A" was chosen in the morning and possibility "y" occurs after "Lot 
B" was chosen. 
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A basic assumption in game theory is that when a player plays the game， he wil1 know 
when it is his move， i.e.， which bubble he is at， but he wil1 not be able to distinguish 
between the different possibilities in that bubble. If we wanted to capture a player who 
does not forget what he does in the morning， then "x" and "y" should appear in separate 
bubbles. 
The above basic assumption in game theory is a1so typical1y accompanied by the 
presumption that each player knows the game， oressential1y has a copy of the game tree 
in his possession. This assumption gives the p1ayer know1edge not necessari1y of what he 
forgot， but at 1east of the set of possibilities， i.e.， inthe "Evening" either "he chose Lot A 
in the morning" or "he chose Lot B in the morning". We wil1 come back to this 
assumption 1ater in both this section and the next section where we argue that such 
know1edge on the set of possibi1ities wou1d be too much in some contexts. 
Now， we retum to the game tree in question. The numbers at the top of the figure 
represent the payoffs of the professor. If he chooses the same Lot in both the 川10ming"
and the "Evening"， then he gets a payoff of 1. If， however， his choice in the "Morning" 
differs from his choice in the "Evening"， he winds up in the wrong parking 10t and his 
payoff is -1. The extensive game tree of Figure 1 captures the forgetfu1ness of the 
professor about what he did. The negative payoffs capture the potential cost of his 
forgetfu1ness. 
Extensive Games can a1so be used to capture forgetfu1ness of what a person 1earned. For 
example， a person might have found sometime in the past that the film "Amadeus" won 
the academy award for best picture in 1984. When later p1aying a trivia game， he recalls 
that it was either 1984 or 1985. His forgetfulness can be described in the fol1owing 
extensive game， where he wins a payoff of 1 ifhe chooses the correct year and zero if he 
chooses incorrectly. 
To model forgetfulness here， we introduce a fictitious player called "Nature". The ro1e of 
"Nature" is to describe multiple possibilities. The p1ayer's inability to recall what he 
actually leamed may be interpreted as a be1ief that he might have learned something else. 
To incorporate this， we have extended the game to inc1ude the right path as another 
possibi1ity. This path means that Amadeus won in 1985 and the player learned this. ¥¥恒ile
this possibility never actual1y happened， itappears in the mind of the player when he is 











By these two examples， we see that extensive games can be used to describe 
forgetfulness about both what a player did and what he learned.3 In each example， the 
forgetfulness was described using multiple possibilities that the player could not 
distinguish between. 
In extensive games， forgetfulness is always represented by multiple possibilities. This is 
the same way that extensive games treat other types of incomplete or imperfect 
information. A reduction in information is translated into more possibilities. The most 
extreme case of no information may then be interpreted as the largest， possibly an infinite， 
set of possibilities. No memory could be treated in much the same way， i.e.， asthinking 
there are a large set of possible things 1 might have done and/or learned. 
Recall that with the standard assumption that the player has the game tree， he would 
always be able to determine the set of possible things he might have forgotten. 
On the other hand， having limited， or no memory might not quite be the same as thinking 
a large number of things could have happened. In fact， a player with very limited memory 
might not think anything happened in the past， or might not be aware of anything having 
happened. In this case， we would not be able to accurately describe the player's lack of 
memory by a game theoretic model， or at least not by one that the player is aware of. 
Recall that a player with the game tree would be given the complete set of possible 
historIes at each of his moves. 
3 In the literature of extensive games， several formal conditions on a player's information partition have 
been used to describe various types of memory starting with Kuhn's (1953) condition of perfect recall. 
Other conditions involving les than perfect recal are given and discussed by Okada (1987)， Kaneko-Kline 
(1995)， Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) and Bonanno (2002). 
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2. Individual Memory in Info-memory Protocols 
Kaneko and Kline (2003) developed Info-memory protocols to describe individuals who 
might have no good idea about the complete set of possible histories. Rather than carving 
the set of possibilities using their experiences， these individuals might build up their view 
of the world from their memories of those experiences. To describe such players， itis 
important to allow for limited memory that is not described simply by sets of possibi1ties. 
In order to do this， memory is described in an info-memory protocol by a memoη 
imction. While an extensive game can be used to describe individual memory of a player 
as we saw in the previous section， Kaneko and Kline take the position that the memory 
should be described separately. They stil allow the extensive game to describe the 
transmission of information to players. For example， the game of Figure 1 describes the 
following transmission of information: 
(a) In the Morning， information is transmitted to the player that he can park at Lot A or 
Lot B， and nothing else. 
(b) In the Evening， information is transmitted to the player that he can walk to Lot A or 
Lot B， and nothing else. 
In this way the extensive game is used to show that the information about the set of 
possible actions is transmitted to the player at each of his moves. 
This says nothing about his memory and is consistent with players having various types 
of memory ranging from complete forgetfulness to perfect memory. 
Continuing with this example， ifwe want to describe a player who forgets what he did， 
we could use the following memory function. 
(1) m(x)= m(y) = m(xo) = {・}.
No matter what the situation is， the player recalls nothing about the past. The symbol ・
is used here to describe a memory of nothing. 
To describe a player who recalls what he did， we might use the following memory 
function: 
(2) m(xo) ={・}， m(x) = {Lot A in morning} m(y) ={Lot B in morning}. 
Notice that the memory function assigns a memory to the player at each of the objective 
possibilities xo， x， and y. The player need not be aware of this set; he simply has the 
memory m(xo) in the morning. Then in the evening， he has either the memory m(x) or 
m(y). We use set theoretic brackets in describing the value of a memory to allow the 
player's forgetfulness to involve a set of possibilities. For example， consider the 
following memory function: 
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(3) m(xo) = {・}， m(x)=m(y)={"Lot A in morning"， "Lot B in morning"}. 
The memory function (3) describes a player who remembers in the Evening that either he 
parked in Lot A in the morning or he parked in Lot B in the moming. This is different 
from the memory function (1) which describes a player who has the memory of nothing 
each time he moves. 
We return now to the standard assumption in extensive game theory that the player 
knows the game tre. If the player is fully aware of the game tree described in Figure 1， 
then the memory functions (1) and (3) would leave him with equivalent information. 
However， ifwe want to describe players who are not aware of the game tree， the 
distinction between (1) and (3) could be relevant. Suppose the player wanted to construct 
a view of the game he is playing. Since (3) has more ingredients than what is in (1)， we 
might expect a better construction from a player with memory described by (3). The 
description of (1) gives only memories of nothing. The description of (3) gives memories 
of "Lot A in the morning" or "Lot B in the morning". 
The additional structure of a memory function enhances our description of a game 
situation. Kaneko and Kline (2004) are using the memory function and its contents to 
describe how a player might construct his view of the game situation from his memories 
of past experiences. Because his experiences and memories are limited， so might be his 
view of the game situation. 
In addition to this， we believe the description of memory by memory functions could 
have other applications in describing different types of memory that have escaped game 
theoretic analysis. 
We end with one such example. Lisa has just been informed that a movie wil1 be made of 
a book she read in the past. The book and movie are called: "Di vine Secrets of the Ya Ya 
Sisterhood." Jeff asks Lisa what the meaning ofthe Ya Ya Sisterhood is. Lisa responds 
that she cannot recall the meaning， but that if she saw it in a list， she would know it. 
We might simply describe Lisa's memory at the current true situation "x" by the memory 
function: 
(4) m( x)= {"Ya Ya Sisterhood means something 1 knew before and wil1 recall if 1 see it in 
a list"} 
This， more or less， captures the situation at hand. Suppose， however， that we try to use an 
extensive game to describe this situation， and let Lisa know the game. The game tree will 
be constructed from a set of possible meanings for Ya Ya Sisterhood. If this set inc1udes 
the truth， then Lisa will find the true meaning when she is made aware of the tre. If， on 
the contrary， the set does not include the truth， then while one could argue that this 
extensive game describes a situation like Lisa's， there are two difficu1ties. 
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First， we would now need a separate extensive game to describe the objective truth， by 
which 1 mean the true meaning of Ya Ya Sisterhood. A single extensive game could no 
longer simultaneously describe Lisa's memory and the objective truth. In contrast， a 
single info-memory protocol， by separating memory from the objective truth， allows for 
such a description， and involves no false memories. 
Secondly， 1 don't believe that an incomplete list of possibilities would accurately describe 
Lisa's situation. In contrast， itwould artificially introduce false memories that Lisa does 
not have in the form of false possibilities. The same criticism can be made of the 
description of forgetfulness in Figure 2 where a false memory was introduced to describe 
forgetfulness of the year Amadeus won the Oscar. 
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